Industries · Critical infrastructure

Keep the lights on. Prove who touched them.

Grids, water networks and telecom cores are run by systems built to last thirty years. R-Series is designed to add post-quantum trust around them, and a receipt to every control action an operator or agent takes (in development; nothing deployed).

Book a briefingIoT & OT approach
ApproachGateways first
To be proved onThe DCS bench (not built yet)
OT/IoT lineIn development
00 Thirty-year assets

Infrastructure is built to outlast every algorithm it uses.

Substations, pumping stations and telecom cores are designed for decades of service. Their control systems were often specified before encryption was expected, and the cryptography that was added later is almost all RSA or elliptic-curve.

At the same time, operators and AI agents are being given more remote control over them. Every setpoint change and configuration push is a potential incident, and regulators increasingly expect an attributable, tamper-evident record of who did what.

R-Series is designed to address both: gateways bring hybrid post-quantum protection to assets that cannot be upgraded, and every control action leaves a receipt.

01 Sectors
ENERGY

Grid and generation

Receipted setpoints and dispatch decisions; hybrid sessions from substations to control centres.

WATER

Treatment and distribution

Chemical dosing and valve commands with an attributable, tamper-evident trail.

TELECOM

Network cores

Configuration changes by people and agents, signed and chained, across vendors.

02 What gets a receipt

Every control action, attributable and tamper-evident.

ActionWho takes itWhat the receipt records
Setpoint changeOperator or agentWho asked, the old and new value, the controller, and the approval it ran under
Configuration pushEngineer or toolA hash of the configuration before and after, and the change ticket it belongs to
Firmware updateVendor or integratorThe signed image digest, the signer's key and the devices that accepted it
Crypto migration stepThe migration programmeWhich link moved from classical to hybrid, and the evidence that it did
Remote sessionSupport staffWhen the session opened and closed, from where, and what it touched

Receipts record hashes and identifiers, not process data. Control traffic itself is never routed through DCS.

03 Approach

Migrate around the machines.

City grid01 / 04
01

Survey the estate

Generation, the street network, substations and the city load they serve: controllers, RTUs, historians and links, with the cryptography each one actually uses.

02

Scan and rank

The sweep finds classical-only links at the substations. Assets that will still be in service in 2035 come first.

03

Wrap them in gateways

Hybrid signing and key exchange at each substation, for devices that cannot carry it themselves.

04

Protected, and on the record

The gateway's WAN leg runs hybrid key exchange; devices keep their own cryptography; each migration step is a receipt the regulator can check.

04 Where the line stands

Early, and labelled that way.

The OT/IoT line is the newest of our programmes. Most of it is design and bench work; nothing here is a field deployment.

STATUS

OT / IoT migration

Design and bench work. The reference gateway, the bench and firmware signing are specified, and the bench comes before any named pilot.

In development

WORK WITH US

Design partnership

Cryptographic inventory and change evidence (CBOM + before/after diff) — design partnership, limited slots.

GATEWAY

DCS OT Gateway

Reference hardware that reads the cell without touching the controller.

See the gateway

BENCH

Proved on the bench first

Four zones and a set of gates every claim must pass.

The OT/IoT programme

FIRMWARE

Firmware signing

Hash-based signatures with signer state kept off the device.

See firmware signing

Start with one substation.

Cryptographic inventory and change evidence (CBOM + before/after diff) — design partnership, limited slots.

Book a briefing
05 Questions

From operators.

Does it work on isolated networks?

Receipts verify offline. Anchoring to a public chain is in development; when available it can be batched and exported through a data diode, or skipped where policy forbids it.

Is this post-quantum secure for our plant today?

No, and we do not say so. Gateways add hybrid post-quantum protection on the links they wrap; devices behind them keep their own cryptography until they are replaced. Each step is recorded so you can show exactly what moved.

Which standards does it map to?

A reference-only crosswalk to IEC 62443, NIST SP 800-82 and CERT-In BOM guidance is in development; no compliance claim is made before an external assessment. Until then, receipts are offered as evidence support, not as a compliance claim.

What do regulators get?

A signed inventory, a migration ledger and receipts for control actions, labelled as evidence support for the frameworks you report against.

In development — talk to us about a design partnership.

Want the details for your sector? Book a briefing — we share the full design and a live demo in a private session.